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5.1  Introduction 
In December 1990, the R.O.C. Council for Economic Planning and Devel- 
opment announced the Six-Year Plan for Economic Development. According 
to this plan, the government will issue NT$1,100 billion in bonds to finance 
public investment. In fact, the government will spend NT$8,238.2  billion over 
six years to restructure the economy. This amounts to raising public investment 
by NT$1,370 billion each year. Since public investment in 1990 was about 11 
percent of  GNP, this means that the ratio of  government investment to GNP 
will be 0.435 if  the plan is fully enforced. However, the government claimed 
that only part of the expenditure will be financed by debt, which will amount 
to 5 percent of GNP per year. Many controversies have arisen since the plan 
was announced. The popular view is that the plan is too ambitious and will 
disturb the economy by crowding out private investment and by worsening the 
fiscal structure of  the government. Moreover, as shown by  recent data, only 
one-third of the plan has been put into effect. This is due to the constraint of 
the government budget deficit. As  we will see in table 5.1, the government 
budget has worsened during the past three years. Thus, in the following analy- 
sis, we  will consider the case in which government investment increases by 
1.67 percent of  GNP per year for six years; in other words, we will take the 
size of government investment as given. 
In the macroeconomics literature, it is well known that in Blinder and So- 
low’s (1974) and Tobin and Buiter’s (1976) models, public expenditure will not 
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cause a large crowding-out effect on private expenditure. And in these models, 
output and employment effects are positive as long as stability conditions are 
satisfied. On the other hand, Barro (1989; 1990, chap. 14) showed that, under 
a neoclassical growth model, debt neutrality or the Ricardian equivalence theo- 
rem will not hold under an income tax scheme. In addition, as pointed out by 
Modigliani (see Haliassos and Tobin 1990), less capital will be accumulated 
as long as private investment is crowded out. This is also true even though 
public capital can be accumulated through public investment, as long as the 
productivity of public capital is less than that of private capital. Moreover, in 
an open economy foreigners will hold domestic public debt. This will induce 
more interest payments to foreigners. When the government budget deficit is 
large, a deficit in the current account is likely to appear. 
Barro (1989) suggested that a calibrated equilibrium model be simulated to 
get more quantitative information about the consequences of fiscal policy (see 
also King, Plosser, and Rebelo 1988). In this paper, we set up a Solow-Cass- 
Koopmans  growth  model  (in contrast to  Blanchard  1985 and  Matsuyama 
1987) and follow Barro's suggestion and analyze the effects of public invest- 
ment with deficit financing using Taiwanese data, given the size of government 
investment. This extends Barro's (1989) and King, Plosser, and Rebelo's (1988) 
work to the open economy case. We  try  to verify several points shown in 
these models. 
This chapter will be organized as follows: In section 5.2, a closed economy 
model is set up to analyze the effects of  deficit-financed public investment. 
Section 5.3 extends the model to a small open economy. Section 5.4 uses Tai- 
wanese data to calibrate the models described in the preceding sections. Con- 
cluding remarks are given in the last section. 
5.2  The Basic Model 
As shown in table 5.1, the average annual growth rate of real per capita GNP 
in Taiwan has been about 7 percent during the last 25 years. The unemployment 
rate has been below 3 percent each year. It is reasonable to regard the Taiwan- 
ese economy as growing on the full-employment path. The main contributions 
to the growth of the economy are the growth of exports and national investment 
(including government investment). In this section, we follow Barro's neoclas- 
sical approach to fiscal policy and consider the effects of  public investment 
through bond financing in a closed economy (see Barro 1989). The economy 
is divided into three sectors, i.e., households, firms, and the government. Each 
firm is assumed to be perfectly competitive and to have a Cobb-Douglas pro- 
duction function; i.e., 
where A, is temporary technological shock, X, is labor-augmenting or Harrod- 
neutral permanent technological shock, K; is public capital, K, is private capi- 
tal, and Og,  On, and 8, are output elasticities of Kg, AX,  and K, respectively. It is 131  Debt Financing, Public Investment, and Economic Growth in Taiwan 
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Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, R.O.C., Taiwan Statistical Data Book 
(Taipei, 1993). 
Note: Ey = fiscal year; r = rediscount rate (percent per annum); Yg = annual growth rate of real 
per capital GNP; Iy = the ratio of gross capital formation to GNP (percent per annum); GCy = 
the ratio of government investment to GNP (percent per annum); GIy = the ratio of government 
investment to GNP (percent per annum); GIi  = the ratio of the government investment to total 
gross capital formation; u = unemployment rate (percent per annum); BD = government budget 
deficit for each fiscal year, starting from July 1 of the preceding year to June 30 of the designated 
year (million NT dollars). 
assumed that 8,  + 8, + Ok  = 1; i.e., the production function gives diminishing 
returns with respect to total capital (K + Kg), but constant returns to scale with 
respect to total capital and effective labor. 
It is assumed that both private and public capital have the same depreciation 
rate. Their accumulations are 
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where Z, and Zf  are private and public investment, respectively, and 6 is the 
depreciation rate. Let T,  be the tax rate on the output. The representative firm’s 
net cash flow after taxes is 
(4)  n, = (1 -  T,)A,(K~)e&?(N:’X,)en  -  W,NfXt -  rkf-lKr, 
where W, is the real wage rate and rkr-l  is the unit user or rental cost of capital. 
The quantity r, is made up of three components: the interest cost, the deprecia- 
tion cost, and the capital gain or loss of a unit of capital (see Jorgenson 1963). 
The interest cost is the opportunity cost of retaining earnings used to invest 
(see Abel and Bernanke 1992, chap. 6). Since the price of capital equals that 
of the private consumption good, we will not consider the inflation problem. 
Rather, we will assume no gain or loss on capital. We  will also assume that 
there is no tax on interest income. Thus, 
(5)  r,,_, = r,-, + 6, 
where I is the interest rate of the loanable fund market. The firm  maximizes 
after-tax net cash flows in each period by  choosing optimal Np  and K,,,  (and 
therefore I,). 
The representative household maximizes its lifetime utility by choosing op- 
timal leisure, labor supply, and consumption. The household consumes private 
and public goods. Following Barro (1989), we will assume that the household 
consumes a composite consumption good (C,*)  which is the linear combination 
of private consumption (C,) and public consumption C;)  goods. Let 15,  and 
be the leisure and labor supplies, and let p and p be the discount factor and the 
time preference rate. The household holds capital (K,) and public debt (D,)  at 
the beginning of each period. Let rd be the interest rate of public debt and S, 
be the total real assets held by the household at the beginning of period t. Then, 
the household’s optimization problem can be described by the following: 
such that 
(7)  ct*  = c,  + *Cf, 
(8)  L,+F=  1, 
(9)  p = (1 + p)-’, 
(10)  Sr+I  Kf+,  + D,+l  = (l + rf-l)Kr  + (l + rdr-I)Dr 
+ w,yx,  - c,, 
where JI is assumed to be positive and less than one, i.e., 0 < IJJ < 1 (for a 
detailed discussion see Barro 1989) and equation (10) is the household budget 
constraint. Following King et al. (1988) and Baxter and King (1990), we will 
assume that the utility function is in constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
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for u # 1, u > 0, 
(12) 
where l/u is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, while u  is the intertempo- 
ral elasticity of substitution in consumption. 
U(C,*,  L,) = 81nC,* + (1 -  O)lnL,,  for u = 1, 
The government budget constraint in real terms is 
(13)  2, =  D,+, -  D, = r,,-,D,  + Zf  + Cp  + Cp -  T,A,(K;)%-qk(N&Jen 
where Zp,  C;,  and Cp are, respectively, public investment, public consumption 
goods, and basic government purchases without providing utility or productive 
services; D, is public debt at the beginning of period t; and 2, is the budget 




lim n(l  + rJ1D,+, 2  0. 
f+DO  s=o 
The economy-wide resource constraint is given by 
(15)  C,  + K,+, -  (1 -  6)K, + Zf  + Cf + GP  = A,(Kf)%P(N,XJen. 
This is  also  the  equilibrium condition for  the  commodity market. A  no- 
arbitrage condition in the fund market implies that 
(16)  rk, -  6 = r, = r,. 
We make the following definition: 
DEFINITION.  A dynamic general equilibrium is a set of initial conditions 
Do, KO,  K& the process {C,, L,, N,, K,+,, Sr+l,  T,, I:,  Cf, e,  D,,,,  A,, K:, 
x,>  ,(Y  and the prices {W,, r,,r,}L0 such that 
(i) Given the prices {r,.,, W,}, {K:+,,  N:X,}  solves the firm’s maximiza- 
(ii) Given the prices {r,-,, r,.,, W,},  {C,,  L,, NS,  St+,} solves the household 
(iii) Under  {W,, r,, rb}, all markets are in equilibrium; i.e.,  K:+, = K,,,, 
(iv) The government budget constraint (15) is satisfied. 
Condition (iii) implies that the commodity market is also in equilibrium; 
i.e., equation (15) is satisfied by Walras’s law. As shown by King, Plosser, and 
Rebelo (1990), labor and leisure will not grow under restrictions on prefer- 
ences such as equations (11) and (12). In the steady state, C,  Z, K,  Zg, Cg, 8, 
and D (all variables are in per capita terms) grow at the same rate as labor- 
augmenting technical progress. We  follow the method used by  King et al. 
tion problem. 
maximization problem. 
N: = Ns  = N  Dd  - 
r  tl  ,+I  =  Sr+, -  K,+, = Dr+l. 134  Chen-Min Hsu 
(1988, 1990) by dividing all variables in the system by the growth component 
X so that we get a stationary model. 
In appendix A, we solve the problem and characterize the dynamic general 
equilibrium. 
5.3  Fiscal Policies and the Current Account 
The model described in the previous section can be extended to a small open 
economy such as the Taiwanese economy. In this paper, the exchange rate is 
assumed to be fixed, since no currencies are formally introduced. We  will as- 
sume that  capital moves  perfectly  across countries. Foreign and  domestic 
assets are perfect substitutes. However, interest income from foreign assets is 
taxed at the same rate as that on the capital stock. Let rf  be the interest rate in 
the foreign loanable fund market. Then, a no-arbitrage condition implies that 
(17) 
Following Buiter (1987) and Klundert and Ploeg (1989), we will specify tax 
rules and spending rules for the government sector so that the solvency of the 
economy can be satisfied: 
(18) 
(19) 
wheref, is foreign assets held by  each household and T, is the tax on foreign 
assets per capita. Proportional tax is imposed on foreign assets. Equations (18) 
and (19) imply that these taxes are used in basic government expenditure- 
national defense, foreign transfer payments, and so forth. In the following anal- 
ysis, we will set .$,  = .$,  = 0. The household’s budget constraint becomes 
(20) 
And equation (17) can be rewritten as 
(21) 
Moreover, the government budget constraint becomes 
(22) 
0,r: = Y,  = 0,Yk1 -  6. 
T, = .$,A  + .$2f,+l’ 
g; = 63°C + S4ftfl’ 
X(.t+I  + k,,,  + d,,,)  = (1 + r,)(k,  + 4)  + (1 +  -  SJf, 
+ WIN, -  c,. 
n,r: -  5, = n,r,, -  6. 
z, = r,d, + if + cf + gz -  T,(Y, +  f,) -  T, 
= r,d, + i:!  + cf + (E3 - 1).$,f, -  T,(Y, +f,h 
We  define net export as the difference between the accumulation of  foreign 
assets and interest income from foreign assets. That is, 
(23) 
where e,  is the net export per capita. Thus, from the composition of the national 
income account, we have 
e, = r,f,+,  -  (1 + 135  Debt Financing, Public Investment, and Economic Growth in Taiwan 
(24)  GDP, =  y, = ci + i, + g, + e, 
= c,  + i, + g, + r,f,+,  -  (1 + rflf, 
and 
(25)  GNP, =  y, + rx 
= c,  + i, + g, + YXX+,  -x3 
where y,f,+, -  f,  is the current account balance. That is (see Sachs 1982), 
(26) 
The commodity market is in equilibrium under the condition 
(27) 
CA = y,f,+, -f, = rx  + el. 
c,*  + y,k,+, -  (1 - W,  + if  + (1 -  Qkf: + gZ  + r,f,+, 
-  (1 + rfX  = Y,, 
c:  + y&,+, -  (1 - w,  + if:  + (1 -  Wcf: + r,f,+, 
-  (1 + yf -  5,5&  = Y,. 
or 
(28) 
To avoid explosive foreign debt, we impose the NPG condition, i.e., 
lim(1 + rf)-x  2 0. 
I+== 
Combining equations (27) and (29), we have the intertemporal resource con- 
straint for the economy; that is, 
The solution of the model appears in appendix B. 
5.4  Numerical Analysis 
In the following, we  will use Taiwanese data to simulate our model. The 
sources of the data are from the Directorate-General of  Budget, Accounting 
and Statistics (DGBAS), Quarterly National Economic Trends, Taiwan Area, 
The Republic of  China (Taipei, various issues), the Yearbook of  Financial Sta- 
tistics of  the R.O.C. (Taipei, various issues), and Aggregate Supply and De- 
mand Quarterly Econometric Model in the Taiwan Area, no. 8 (Taipei, Novem- 
ber  1990) (i.e.,  DGBAS  model  no.  8).  We  use  1990 as  the  base  year. 
Coefficient data are reported in tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
It should be noted that the coefficients are chosen to match Taiwanese factor 
share data (see DGBAS model no. 8). 8,  + Ok  = 1 -  8,  = 0.4353. Since there 
is no disaggregated data for the  sectoral capital stock, we  set 8,  = Ok  = 
0.21765. This also matches the data, since in the most recent years the ratio of 136  Chen-Min Hsu 
Table 5.2  Parameters and Characteristic Roots for the Closed Economy Case 
Parameters for the production function: 
0,  = 0.21765 
e,  = 0.21765 
en = 0.5647 
6 = 0.0138 
y,  = 1.07 
Parameters for the utility function: 
o=l 
p = 0.9953 
8 = 0.36956 
4 = 0.25 
Other coefficients: 
s,,  = 0.1  1 
SSb = 0 
sCg = 0.15 
d = 0.05 
Characteristic  roots: 
1.24203; 0.8567076 
Table 5.3  Parameters and Characteristic Roots for the Open Economy Case 
Parameters for the production function: 
See table 5.2 
Parameters for the utility function: 
cr=l 
p = 0.9953 
Q  = 0.25 
e = 0.34982 
Coefficients for the feedback rules: 
5, = -0.028 
5,  = 0 
Other coefficients: 
s,  = 0.629 
See table 5.2 
Characteristic roots: 
1.00378867; 0.9733067 
investment to GNP in the government sector has been almost 50 percent each 
year (see table 5.1). We  choose p so that the interest rate is 7.75 percent, i.e., 
p = 0.9953. This is the 1990 rediscount rate (see table 5.1). And we choose 8 
so that in the steady state N  = 0.3, i.e., 8 = 0.36956. The tax rate can be 
found from the government budget constraint. We will assume that the ratio of 137  Debt Financing, Public Investment, and Economic Growth in Taiwan 
government expenditure to GNP increases by  1.67 percent each year for six 
years. Onginally, the ratio of government investment to GNP was supposed to 
have increased 5 percent each year for six years. However, according recent 
data, the Six-Year Plan has been slowed down because of financial problems. 
It turned out that only one-third of the plan was realized each year after 1991. 
Thus, the ratio of  government investment to GNP became 1.67 percent each 
year. Government expenditure is financed through public debt and taxes. The 
public debts are five-year bonds which each year pay back one-quarter of the 
par value from the year following the issuing date. Interest payments are fi- 
nanced by taxation. 
To see how well the basic structure mimics the actual Taiwanese data, we 
have examined standard deviations and correlations  with output, which are pre- 
sented in table 5.4. Here the first two columns report statistics for the Taiwan- 
ese economy using actual quarterly Taiwanese data for 1966.1-1992.4.  These 
standard deviations are measured relative to the average values, with the depar- 
tures from the average in percentage form. From these values it is apparent that 
actual consumption fluctuates less, and both private and public investment 
much more, than total output in percentage terms. 
In the third and fourth columns, comparable figures are reported for a ver- 
sion of the closed economy model that was specified in section 5.2. The magni- 
tude of output fluctuation is governed by the variance of the public investment 
shock financed by income taxes. From the data in the third column, it is clear 
that both consumption and private investment vary  more than output. The 
higher fluctuation of consumption is partly due to income tax increases. How- 
ever, the contemporaneous correlations of the other variables with output re- 
ported in table 5.4 show that the basic model matches the actual data rather 
well. 
It should be noted that before 1987  the central bank in Taiwan imposed strict 
foreign exchange controls on non-trade-related outward remittance by  local 
residents. Both outward and inward remittances of  direct capital investment 
were also subject to approval by  the Investment Commission of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs. Although the central bank allowed the exchange rate to 
Table 5.4  Comparison of the Taiwanese Economy and the Basic Model 
Taiwanese Economy"  Basic Model 
Standard  Correlation  Standard  Correlation 
Variables  Deviation (Ti)  with Output  Deviation (%)  with Output 
~~  ~~ 
output  .65  1  .46  1 
Consumption  .61  .99  .60  .99 
Investment  .72  .95  .76  .94 
Capital stock  .ll  .88  .65  .96 
"The Taiwanese quarterly data used are real GDP, private consumption, gross private investment, 
and total capital stock (all in 1986 NT dollars). 138  Chen-Min Hsu 
float in July 1978, it still managed the exchange rate quite tightly. In July 1987, 
foreign exchange control was released. Since October 1992, each person has 
been allowed to remit outward and inward up to an annual limit of  U.S.$5 
million. The central bank went further toward lifting restrictions and raised the 
ceiling on foreign liabilities of  all commercial banks. It is easy to see that 
during the last few years foreign exchange controls have been almost com- 
pletely relaxed. This is the reason why we chose the basic model for compari- 
son with the actual data. 
5.4.1 
It is easy to show that the dynamical system described in section 5.2 has two 
characteristic roots: the absolute value of one characteristic root is greater than 
one, while the other is less than one. The steady state of the system is thus a 
saddle point. This is obvious for a dynamical system with one predetermined 
variable  (i.e., capital stock) and an unpredetermined variable (i.e., shadow 
price of real asset). 
Suppose that public investment is financed through public debt. Since all 
individuals expect that future taxes will be raised to pay current debts, after- 
tax returns will decline. Private investment will thus be crowded out. As we 
can see from figure 5.1, taxes rise with public debt accumulation. This results 
in large crowding-out effects on private investment and consumption. The dy- 
namic paths of  the economy will gradually converge to a long-term equilib- 
rium path once the principal of  the debts is paid back. As we can see from 
figure 5.1, when public investment starts to increase initially, output also in- 
creases. However, private investment decreases slightly, since the after-tax re- 
turn on private investment becomes lower. In a closed economy, since output 
equals total expenditure, total expenditure will go down, and therefore both 
private consumption and investment are crowded out. Compared to private in- 
vestment, private consumption declines slowly. This reflects a consumption- 
smoothing pattern. In addition, labor also decreases with output. This causes 
higher labor productivity and a higher real wage rate. As consumption goes 
down, the marginal utility of consumption will rise, and therefore the intertem- 
poral marginal value of  assets (A) also rises. This induces more savings and a 
greater desire by households to hold bonds. Although the private capital stock 
decreases with private investment, the real rental rate initially is lowered. This 
might be due to less labor and output. 
We show the effects of tax-financed public investment in figure 5.2. Since it 
is income taxes rather than lump-sum taxes that are raised to finance govern- 
ment expenditure, there exists an intertemporal substitution effect on labor. 
Thus, the Ricardian equivalence theorem will not hold. Comparing these two 
cases in  figures 5.1 and 5.2, we  find that debt-financed public investment 
crowds out private expenditure less. In fact, public debt has a tax-smoothing 
effect and lessens the government’s need for unusually high tax receipts when 
government expenditure increases (see Abel and Blanchard 1983). 
Simulation Results for the Closed Economy Case A  B 
private consumption 
%  -1 
5  10  15  20  5  10  15  20 
-1 5  -3 




5  10  15  20  0  5  10  15  20 
-3 
years  years 
E  F 
real rental 
-0.5 
5  10  15  20  0  5  10  15  20 
years  years 
G  H 
intertemporal price  private capital 
%  % 
0 
10  15  20 
term In years  years 
Fig. 5.1  Debt-financed case (closed economy). (A) output, (E)  private 
consumption, (C) private investment, (0)  labor input, (E)  real wage, (F)  real 
rental, (G) intertemporal price, (H)  private capital. 140  Chen-Min Hsu 
A  B 
private consumption 
% 
10  15  20  0  5  10  15 
-2 
years  years 









Fig. 5.2  Tax-financed case (closed economy). (A) output, (B)  private 
consumption, (C) private investment, (0)  private capital. 
5.4.2  Simulation Results for the Small Open Economy Case 
As shown in figure 5.3, the income tax rate also rises with public debt. Thus, 
private expenditure will again be crowded out. However, in contrast to the 
closed economy case, the private sector in  an open economy is allowed to 
borrow abroad and to import foreign goods. Consumption is now smoother, 
since households can buy foreign goods. Decreases in the marginal utility of 
consumption imply low intertemporal asset value and thus low savings. Public 
debt is eventually held by foreigners. This implies a current-account deficit as 
well as a government budget deficit. Moreover, the intertemporal substitution 
effect of taxation on labor causes lower labor supply and therefore low produc- 
tivity of capital. 
Comparing this to the closed economy case, we find that output decreases 
more and the tax rate is higher in an open economy. In an open economy with 
more foreign debts and more imported goods, the demand for domestic goods 
will decrease. This will cause output production to decline. And the derived 
demand for domestic inputs will also fall. Since the tax base has become 
smaller, the tax rate should be raised so that the government budget can be bal- 
anced. 
It is hard to compare the welfare levels of two different economies. Even 
though we  choose private consumption as a guideline, we  still cannot get a 
definite answer. Private consumption in the open economy converges after 35 
years (not shown in fig. 5.3B), while in the closed economy it converges very 
quickly. 141  Debt Financing, Public Investment, and Economic Growth in Taiwan 
Suppose that public capital is unproductive; i.e.,  Og = 0, while 8,  + 8,  = 
1. This will not change the patterns of  output, private consumption, private 
investment, and private capital. However, all of these variables decrease much 
more. For example, the lower bound of the output is four times less than in the 
former case. 
Different values of  the time preference rate affect the consumption path. 
The higher the rate of time preference, the lower the discount factor. And 
people become less patient. Thus, initial private consumption increases more 
than before and does not decline so quickly after the initial shock. However, 
the time patterns of other variables do not change significantly. 
5.5  Conclusions 
We  have set up a market-clearing or neoclassical growth model to analyze 
the effects of public investment with debt financing. By utilizing Taiwanese 
data to simulate the model we have found that crowding-out effects on private 
investment do exist in both the open economy case and the closed economy 
case. Moreover, we have also confirmed a known result, that the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem does not hold when an income tax system is introduced. 
It is also found that consumption is more smoothing and crowds out less 
in the open economy. However, it is because of  capital outflows that private 
investment is crowded out more in the open economy than in the closed econ- 
omy. We  also found that public  investment financed by  debt causes both 
current-account and government budget deficits in the open economy. As for 
the effects on income and employment, this paper found that in the open econ- 
omy deficit-financed public investment is more expensive in the long run. All 
these findings conform to recent Taiwanese experience as more labor shortages 
prevailed and more funds flowed out, especially to mainland China and south 
Asian countries. 
From the preceding analysis we obtain implications for government policies. 
The analysis suggests that the government should not intervene too much in 
production and investment. Most projects of the Six-Year Plan could be opened 
to investment by private firms, and by foreign investors, since the main purpose 
of the plan is to induce more private investment and foreign technology trans- 
fer. Introducing foreign capital also lessens the stringent fund situation in the 
short run. However, the analysis also suggests that the government should not 
borrow abroad, since a lot of foreign reserves are held by the central bank and 
much of the money stock is still in the hands of the public. Instead, the foreign 
exchange reserves could be used to finance public investment as long as the 
domestic interest rate is not much higher than the world interest rate. In addi- 
tion, this can lessen the fiscal budget deficit as well as the current-account 
deficit. From recent experience, the government has become aware of this situ- 
ation. Through a development  bank, the central bank has started to lend foreign 
reserves to the administration sector to purchase foreign goods. 142  Chen-Min Hsu 
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Fig. 5.3  Debt-financed case (open economy). (A) output, (B)  private 
consumption, (C) private investment, (0)  labor input, (E)  real wage, (F)  real 
rental, (G) intertemporal price, (H)  foreign asset, (Z)  private capital, (J)  current 
account. 
Appendix A 
In this appendix, we will solve the household’s optimization problem given in 
section 5.2. And the dynamic general equilibrium of the model will be log- 
linearized. 
=  X,+JX,. The household’s 
lifetime utility function becomes 
Let c, = C,/X,, k, = K,/X,, it =  Zr/Xr,  etc., and 
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Fig. 5.3  (continued) 
if u  =1, 
where 
and p* = py:(l-l/u),  while X, is given. We  will assume that p* < 1 so that the 
expression in equation (Al) is bounded. The transformed optimization prob- 
lem of the household can be described as follows: 
M 





Let the Lagrangian be 
YA+, = (1 + rt-l)s, + WJ? + Cr, 
s, =  k, + d,. 
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where A, is the Lagrange multiplier and U,(*)  and U2(*)  are the partial deriva- 
tives of  U(.)  with respect to c:  and 1 -  Y. Equations (A4) and (A5) describe 
the trade-offs among consumption, leisure, and saving. Equation (A6) is the 
Euler equation or the intertemporal efficiency condition. Equation (A7) is the 
household's budget constraint. And equation (A8) is the transversality con- 
dition. 
The production function and the capital accumulation become 
649)  y, = A,(Q)'gPkN>, 
(A10) 
The optimization condition for the firm is thus 
(A1 1) 
(A 12) 
where R, = 1 -  7, and F,(.)  and F,(.) are the marginal productivities of capital 
and labor, respectively. Equations (A1  1) and (A12) are the marginal conditions 
for the firm. 
Yxkr+l  = (1 -  S)k, + if. 
R,A,(k:)egF,(q:',  Np) = Yk,-, = rr-, + 8, 
R,A,(k:)"F,(q:l, N;) = w,, 
A dynamic general equilibrium can be described as follows: 
('417)  c,*  1-  yxk,+, -  (1 -  S)k, + if + (1 -  *)Cf 
+ gz  = A,(kf)%F(k,,  N,). 
From equations (A13)-(A17) and the definition of  =  (1 -  7), we can solve 
for c,?, N,, k,, A,,  7,, and a,,  which are functions of exogenous variables. How- 
ever, these functions will be nonlinear. In order to do further analysis, we will 
follow King et al. (1990) by using the log-linearization method. From equation 
(A16) we can find the wedge function a,.  Approximation of R, near stationary 
levels (k,  N, A, B, is, cg, gb,  d, z), where B =  (kg)%, yields 
(A18)  fi, = wKit  +  + wAil,+  wBbr  + o,$  + w2?f + w,jjp 
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where the values of w are elasticities of the wedge function Q, = 1 -  T, and i, 
= log (kjk),  etc. Also, we can take the log-linearization of equations (A13), 
(A14), and (A15) to get 
N 
1-N  Ecc2,* - sci-fir = A,, 
AJl  = A, + (aA  + l)i, + (ws + I)B, + (OK  (A20)  512:  -  5,,TN 
N 
+ EN&  + (w,  + tNN)iV,  + wl;;  + w*i.:  + w,g;  + WD;II + wz&,, 
(A21)  + qA'r+l  + qBhr+l  + T&r+I  + qN'r+l  +ATl'f+l + %':+I 
+ ~,2P+l  + q&r+l  + qzZ+l = 
where the values of 5 on the left-hand sides of equations (A19) and (A20) are 
elasticities of marginal utility, while those on the right-hand sides are elastici- 
ties of marginal productivities (see King et al. 1990). The values of q  in equa- 
tion (A21) are elasticities of the net after-tax marginal product of capital. 
Finally, differentiation of the commodity-market equilibrium condition im- 
plies 
(A22)  A,  + Bl + snfir  + skil  =As,?$  + sip;: + (1 -  $)s,$f  + s,d: 
where s,,  sk,  s,,  si,, s,,,  s,,, and si are output shares of labor, capital, consump- 
tion (c*),  government expenditure, and investment and + =  Kr+,/Zl. 
+ siw,,, -  si(+ -  1 If,, 
Appendix B 
The first-order conditions for the household's optimization problem in section 
5.3 are 
(B2)  U2(C,*,  1 -  y)  = x,w,, 
(B3)  P*Xr+l(l +  = '1~x7 
034) 
(B5) 
where s, =  k, + d, +  f,. And the firm's optimization conditions are 
(B6) 
(B7)  QrA,(k~)e~F,(~,  Nf) = W,. 
From equations (B 1)-(B7) and market equilibrium conditions, we have 
W,NS  + (1 + rI)s, -  C, -  yx~l+l  = 0, 
WINS  + (1 + r,-,)s, -  C, -  Y~s~+~  = 0, 
R,A,(kf)e&'l(~,  N:)  -  6 = r,, 146  Chen-Min Hsu 
Equations (B8)-(B13) solve the processes {c:, N,,  k,+l,  A,,  T,, n,,J+,}.  Follow- 
ing the linearization method we used in appendix A, we have 
(B 14)  fi, = w$,  + my?, + w;A,  + w;&  + w;;; 
+ w;c;  + w;f:  + ";a, + w:i,, 
$:  =  (A,, k:,  if, c;,  d,, z,), 
the values of  qr are the elasticities of  (1 + a,rf -  5,)  with respect to each 
variable, the values of  K are the elasticities of  [rf -  A,(k;)%F,(k,,  n,)]  with re- 
spect to each variable, and sf  =  fly. 147  Debt Financing, Public Investment, and Economic Growth in Taiwan 
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COlIUllent  Ponciano S.  Intal, Jr. 
Chen-Min Hsu utilizes a Barro-type continuous market-clearing intertemporal 
one-sector growth model in evaluating Taiwan’s planned public investment pro- 
gram under the Six-Year Plan for Economic Development. The simulation re- 
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sults are interesting because they are counterintuitive. Specifically, Hsu’s simu- 
lations indicate that Taiwan’s  increased government expenditures under the 
Six-Year Plan would lead to lower growth of national income, albeit not quite 
contemporaneously.  Why? 
Hsu’s simulation results stem from the crowding out of private expenditures, 
especially private investment, arising from the government’s public investment 
program.  The  “crowding-out” result  does  not  conform  to  the  traditional 
crowding-out literature, however. In the literature, crowding out is caused by a 
policy-induced rise in the real interest rate, thereby leading to a lower than 
desired ratio of capital stock to real GNP and lower investment flows. In con- 
trast, Hsu’s simulations show declines in the real interest rate in the first few 
years which, given the marginal condition for the firm in the model, should 
indicate higher private capital stock and positive private investment. Thus, 
there appears to be some inconsistency between the results of the simulations 
and the analytical underpinnings of the standard crowding-out hypothesis. 
Hsu’s  analysis appears to use a different notion or mechanism of crowding 
out. Specifically, the increased government expenditures crowd out private ex- 
penditures because: 
1. the reallocation of  resources from the private sector to the government 
sector entails a misallocation of resources (resulting in deadweight productiv- 
ity and income loss) because the productivity of capital in the government sec- 
tor is presumed less than the productivity of capital in the private sector, and 
2. the concomitant tax rate increases in the future which are needed to pay 
back loans incurred from increased government expenditures are presumed to 
have “distortionary effects” on the marginal productivities of labor and capital, 
thereby resulting in lower than desired capital stock (hence lower private in- 
vestment flow) and labor input. 
It is apparent that given items 1 and 2 above, the magnitude of the public 
investment program is irrelevant; i.e., any incremental public expenditure will 
crowd out private expenditure in Hsu’s model. 
The results of the simulations for the small, open economy case are espe- 
cially counterintuitive: they indicate that government expenditures reduce in- 
come and savings and raise the tax burden in an open economy more than in a 
closed economy. This is counterintuitive because the general presumption is 
that the free flow  of  capital in an open economy reduces the crowding-out 
effect that government expenditures may have in the domestic capital market. 
The simulations show decline in the real interest rate, which is inconsistent 
with the small, open economy case, wherein the domestic interest rate is equal 
to the exogenously given world interest rate assuming no exchange rate change 
and uniform taxation between foreign and domestic assets. The behavior of the 
real interest rate in the simulations can be explained only by currency apprecia- 
tion during the early years of the simulation period, followed by currency de- 
preciation later on. The paper does not state anything, however, on exchange 
rate changes. Indeed, by explicitly assuming no inflation and no capital gains, 
the model implicitly assumes a fixed exchange rate regime. 149  Debt Financing, Public Investment,  and  Economic Growth in Taiwan 
The above discussion brings out the question of whether the Barro-type one- 
sector intertemporal model significantly helps clarify the issues related to Tai- 
wan’s  public investment program. For the most part, the answer is no, because 
the model, at least as specified in  Hsu’s paper, assumes away  the more im- 
portant policy issues in Taiwan’s expenditure program: 
1. Proponents of the government’s public investment program emphasize the 
view that increased government expenditures, which are primarily for infra- 
structure, have  positive externality on  private capital. That is, the marginal 
productivity of  private capital would be higher, the higher the level of  pub- 
lic  capital  stock  (i.e., infrastructure). The  formulation  of  the  production 
function in the  model and  the specification of  the simulations negate this 
possibility and hence do not objectively address this critical, if  contentious, 
issue. 
2. For a small, export-oriented economy like Taiwan’s, the issue of the im- 
pact of a significant government expenditure program on its international  com- 
petitiveness looms large. Taiwan’s economic sectors face different degrees of 
competitive pressures from abroad and have  different rates of productivity 
growth. Given Taiwan’s already very tight labor market, there is a danger that 
large government investment shocks may  push Taiwan’s  wage rates substan- 
tially higher than the rate of growth of labor productivity in the tradeable goods 
sector, thereby endangering Taiwan’s international  competitiveness  unless there 
is a corresponding depreciation of the NT dollar. In addition, for Taiwan’s nu- 
merous small-scale firms, the concomitant wage rate pressures may force them 
to merge or reorganize or to relocate (part of) their operations offshore (e.g., 
to China or Southeast Asia). It may be noted that Taiwan has started importing 
contract labor primarily from Southeast Asia in order to dampen wage rate 
pressures. Nevertheless, this measure can be expected to be merely a pallia- 
tive since a large expenditure shock can be expected to further raise domestic 
wage  rate pressures. Thus, a  two-sector (e.g., tradeable and  nontradeable 
sectors) intertemporal model would provide deeper policy insights into the 
planned  government investment program  than  a  one-sector intertemporal 
model. 
3. With respect to the issue of the magnitude of the government expenditure 
program, Hsu estimates the program to be equal to 5 percent of GNP per year 
for six years. Note that during 1986-90,  Taiwan’s gross domestic saving aver- 
aged about 33 percent of GNP, its gross domestic investment averaged about 
21 percent of GNP, the central government surplus averaged about 0.5 percent 
of  GNP, and the inflation rate averaged 2.2 percent per year. Taiwan’s large 
domestic saving surplus explains the sharp rise in its international  reserves and 
the growing investment outflows to China, Southeast Asia, and the United 
States in recent years. Thus, it seems that crowding out is not as important 
an issue as the issue of  whether the productivity of  the government’s public 
investment program (funded from international reserve drawdown and domes- 
tic saving) is higher than the returns of Taiwan’s savings and investments abroad 
(e.g., international  reserves and foreign direct investment). 150  Chen-Min Hsu 
In sum, the Barro-type continuous market-clearing one-sector intertemporal 
fiscal model may not be the most appropriate model with which to evaluate the 
key policy issues surrounding Taiwan’s public investment program. 
Comment  Yun-Wing Sung 
Chen-Min Hsu extends Barro’s (1989) work to the open economy of Taiwan. 
The paper is interesting as the very ambitious Six-Year Plan for Economic 
Development of Taiwan probably has significant macroeconomic impacts. 
While the macroeconomic impacts of  Taiwan’s Six-Year Plan are certainly 
an important subject, however, the parameter values adopted in the paper arti- 
ficially cast the public sector in a very unfavorable light. According to the 
specification of the production function, public capital and private capital are 
complementary, but the output elasticity of private capital is much higher than 
that of  public capital. As a result, output falls appreciably when the govern- 
ment invests more and the crowding-out effect on private investment is very se- 
rious. 
The empirical relevance of such a characterization of  the Taiwanese econ- 
omy is doubtful. The congestion and overcrowding of Taiwan’s infrastructural 
facilities are well known to visitors, and Galbraith’s famous phrase “private 
affluence, public squalor” may be applicable to Taiwan. While the productivity 
of public projects should be analyzed case by case, there are undoubtedly pub- 
lic projects in Taiwan that can be very productive. 
As the parameter values of such a highly aggregated model cannot be very 
accurate, sensitivity analysis would be very important. However, there is no 
sensitivity analysis in the paper. 
Two of the conclusions of the paper, that the projects of the plan should be 
open to private investors and that the government should use its foreign ex- 
change reserves rather than foreign borrowing, do not follow from the model. 
In fact, such conclusions cannot be obtained from a one-sector neoclassical 
growth model. 
Public projects must generate revenue in order to attract private investment, 
but such revenue has not been taken into account in the government’s budget 
constraint (eq. [13]). Opening public projects to private investment would de- 
crease government borrowing to finance the projects, but government revenue 
would also be decreased. Privatization cannot be recommended unless private 
investors are more efficient than the government in  running such projects. 
Whether private investors are efficient or not cannot be gauged from a one- 
sector growth model. 
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If  the government uses its foreign exchange reserves rather than borrowing 
to finance the projects, it may save interest costs, as the borrowing rate is usu- 
ally higher than the rate of return on the reserves. However, there are good 
reasons to maintain reserves in case of contingency. Whether Taiwan’s reserves 
are too high cannot be determined from a one-sector growth model. 